ABSTRACT Providing top-k query services is relevant for storage servers which collect valuable files/data and process queries for data owners and mobile users. However, this kind of service could incur severe security concerns, because hackers or even the managers/administrators of the servers may steal important data sets and deceive users into responding to forged or incomplete query results. Therefore, these data sets need to be preserved in privacy, and moreover, the users should have the capability to verify the authenticity and integrity of the query results. As users will demand distinct information with various preferences and time domains in the pragmatic world, the traditional top-k queries are insufficient to satisfy their demands. To solve the problem, we provide the functional top-k queries in multi-dimensional space, such that the users can launch queries on the conjunction and sum of the dimensions/attributes. Some recent works have studied how to preserve data privacy and/or integrity for top-k queries on data storage applications. However, these prior works are limited to traditional top-k queries in preserving data privacy and/or integrity without permitting to systematically process top-k queries over encrypted domain in multi-dimensional space and without providing an efficiently verifiable mechanism for the corresponding query results. In this paper, we propose an efficient and effective method, called SFTopk, which addresses more challenging security problems in data privacy and verifiable functional top-k queries in multi-dimensional space. From performance evaluation experiments, it is shown that our proposed method is much more efficient than the prior works in terms of communication overhead and computation cost.
I. INTRODUCTION A. BACKGROUND
With the growth of data storage [24] , storage servers with bountiful storage space are widely deployed around the world such as APP Engine of Google [9] , Blue Cloud of IBM [13] and Dropbox of Y Combinator [34] , etc. Because they are quit accessible, mobile users (resp. data owners) are willing to use these data servers provided by a data storage service provider to retrieve (resp. store) data from any location even paying some service fees. Although the service provider offers users scalable and flexible storage space without the burden of large-scale data center management, the stored data can be accidentally or maliciously disclosed to competitors or adversaries by an untrusted storage server. As happened in the past [15] , the customers' data stored on the storage servers were maliciously exposed to competitors by an employee of a service owner. This unfortunate event not only violated Personal Information Protection law but also led to big economic loss. The security risk of keeping data in private on storage servers is a major concern for data owners. Therefore, the concern of data privacy has to be taken care of when data owners store their data onto storage servers. Intuitively, data owners can apply a secure encryption mechanism (e.g., AES [21] ) to encrypt the data sets before outsourcing them onto storage servers. However, the first challenge is that how a large volume of encrypted data stored on the servers can be systematically and efficiently searched (or processed) for the queries (e.g., top-k queries) launched by users without decrypting the encrypted data sets. That is, for data privacy, an encrypted data searchable scheme should be provided. Furthermore, the encrypted data sets stored on servers may suffer from some security difficulties. For example, the untrusted servers can return the falsely injected data to the users. Thus, the second challenge is that the untrusted servers can violate the correctness of a query result, creating an incomplete query result for the users by replacing some portions of the query result with some other data. Note that data correctness usually refers to both data authenticity and integrity/completeness.
On the other hand, as users will demand distinct information with various preferences and time domains in practice, the traditional top-k query [7] , [22] , [26] , [28] , [29] , [36] , where the k highest (or lowest) ratings of data are retrieved from a large volume of data set, is insufficient to satisfy their demands. As a result, the third challenge is that how to design the functional top-k query to efficiently meet the diversity of users' preferences. The functional top-k query, by definition, is a top-k query type that combines multiple attributes 1 or dimensions into a single query function. That is, a searchable method over encrypted data sets with available query functions can be provided for users. In real life, when making decision, there are many applications with respect to the functional top-k query. For example, if a doctor wants to find out the high risk people group of the cardiovascular disease, he/she will query a combination of multiple attributes (e.g., the indices of blood sugar, blood pressure, triglyceride, and so on [32] ) at the same time. In this case, what is needed is the ability to search on the conjunction of the attributes, ''blood sugar'', ''blood pressure'' and ''triglyceride''. Similarly, an extended example of the conjunct attributes is the encrypted documents (e.g., emails) stored on an untrusted storage server [8] , [25] . Rather than retrieving all encrypted emails, a user might only want to gain the emails which marked the highest urgency ratings and the highest finance ratings. In this case, what is needed is the ability to search on the conjunction of the attributes, ''urgency'' and ''finance''. For applicability of sum query, human resource agency would like to do statistics of migrant workers from various countries and rank these countries whose people hired by enterprises. As another example [16] , if a job seeker wants to find the best job to fit his/her preferences such as commuting distance, salary, and working hours, benefits, etc., he/she might have his/her own ranking by summarizing the scores of these attributes. From the above observations, users desire to issue queries with a combination of multiple attributes and launch functional top-k queries to the storage servers.
As the aforementioned challenges, there are three goals to achieve. First, from the aspect of data privacy, we should provide a searchable scheme to only permit storage servers to process queries over the encrypted domain. Second, from the aspect of data correctness, storage servers should submit verifiable information (e.g., verifiable objects and data owner's signature) along with query results to users since servers may be malicious and have misbehavior (e.g., falsifying stored data, responding false and/or 1 The term ''attributes'' is interchangeable with ''dimensions'' in this paper.
incompleteness query results to users). Third, From the aspect of efficiency and effectiveness of utilization, we define the practical top-k query functions such that different users are able to retrieve the valuable information according to their preferable combination of attributes at any given time. To these ends, a method of secure functional top-k query in multi-dimensional space with small communication overhead and computation cost on transmitting and generating verifiable information needs to be developed so that a storage system can be utilized efficiently and effectively.
B. RELATED WORK
The framework of data outsourcing, permitting data owners to outsource their data to storage servers which process query results and send responses to users, was first proposed in [10] . Generally, for data outsourcing, three security issues need to be addressed: data privacy, data authenticity, and data integrity. Aiming to preserve data privacy, data owners outsource encrypted data to storage servers which are only allowed to employ sophisticated query mechanisms [7] , [22] , [29] to extract the desired information over the encrypted domain. In literatures [3] , [7] , [11] , only storage servers were allowed to process range queries over the encrypted domain. For the other query mechanisms, the methods of secure keyword search [14] , [18] , [22] , [23] are orthogonal to our work. We are more interested in the functional top-k query which provides various query functions for users to obtain query results in combination of the multiple attributes while still preserving data privacy and correctness of query results.
Many researchers [12] , [17] , [20] , [29] , [35] emphasized the correctness of query results. Data owners in these methods outsourced both their collected data and corresponding signatures to storage servers. Subsequently, the storage servers could respond query results, coupled with verifiable objects, to users. Receiving the query results and the verifiable objects, the users could manipulate the verifiable objects to verify authenticity and/or integrity of the query results. Unfortunately, these schemes did not consider the top-k query over encrypted data sets in detail. By contrast, Chen et al. [26] further proposed authenticating top-k queries with confidentiality. Nevertheless, due to the heavy overheads of computation and communication incurred by generating and sending verifiable information, it is impractical and inefficient for the pragmatic applications. Additionally, the aforementioned prior works, except for [29] , did not consider the diversity of users' preferences to supply distinct query functions, that is, they did not consider query processing over multi-dimensional data sets. Although the method in [29] has considered multi-dimensional data sets (called multiple attributes in [29] ), it would cause m times more computation overhead in generating verifiable information than our method does when there are m-dimensional data sets. In addition, the amount of verifiable information may incur heavy overhead in communication. Moreover, due to the essentially limitations of design in [29] , authors can not directly apply functional top-k query to their method. More specifically, when a user receives a data point, combined with multiple signatures for a multi-dimensional data set, as a query result, the user will be confused by the multiple signatures and fails to verify the authenticity and correctness of this data point while running functional top-k queries.
C. OVERVIEW of SFTopk
In this paper, we develop a secure functional top-k query method in multi-dimensional space, called SFTopk. SFTopk manipulates Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [21] with CBC mode and the Order-Preserving Symmetric Encryption (OPSE) [1] to ensure data privacy. To preserve correctness (i.e., authenticity and integrity) of query results, the sophisticated Layered Authenticity tree (called LA tree for short), cooperated with the OPSE, is constructed. It is worth noting that the LA tree is a layer-based data structure, which can build an ordered relation among data points in multidimensional space. Thus, the LA tree can be used to not only verify the correctness of query results, but also process users' demands in multi-dimensional space efficiently. In particular, we make the following contributions:
• We provide the functional top-k query functions (i.e., conjunction and sum of dimensions/attributes) which are not supported in the traditional top-k query.
• We build an LA tree, cooperated with an orderpreserving encryption, to supply capabilities of efficiently retrieving inquired data over encrypted domain in multi-dimensional space and systematically verifying the correctness of query results.
• From the extensive experiments on the realistic data sets, SFTopk is more efficient and effective than prior works while preserving data privacy and correctness in multi-dimensional space. We compare our proposed method, SFTopk, with the most relevant methods, named SPLTopk [29] and ATQ [26] in Table 1 which indicates that SFTopk is more efficient and effective than SPLTopk and ATQ in communication overhead and computation cost while preserving data privacy and correctness.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the definition of SFTopk. Section III describes the details of manipulation of LA tree. The major behaviors of data owners, storage servers and users are illustrated in Section IV, and the system analysis for SFTopk is described in Section V. Section VI describes the performance evaluation, followed by the conclusions in Section VII.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, the definition of SFTopk including the system model, attack model, design goals, and notation and preliminary are formulated and described in detail. 
A. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we consider a storage system, composed of unconditionally trusted data owners, untrusted storage servers and authorized users as shown in Fig. 1 . Without loss of generality, the authorization between data owners and users is appropriately conducted off-line or on-line. However, the authorization of data owners and users is out of the scope of this paper. More details regarding to the authorization of data owners and users can be referred to [33] .
As depicted in Fig. 1 , the data owner has a collection of n files f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f n in a period of time T that he/she wants to outsource onto the storage server in their encrypted form
is applying AES function with a secret key K a . To keep the capability of search over the encrypted data, the data owner needs to build a set of searchable indices (named a set of n m-dimensional data points p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n in this paper), extracted from the set of files. The data point p j is composed of {d l j } m l=1 , where d l j denotes the l-th dimensional data of the data point p j . Before outsourcing, the set of data points also should be encrypted into their encryption form OP p 1 , OP p 2 , . . . , OP p n , where
is an OPSE function [1] with the secret key K o . Then, the data owner stores both the encrypted files and their corresponding encrypted data points on the storage server. It should be noted that these encrypted data points are functioned as indices that can be linked to their corresponding encrypted files, meaning that the inverted indices, storing a list of mappings from the encrypted data points to their corresponding set of encrypted files that VOLUME 3, 2015 contain these data points [2] , is generally employed as indexing structure. Therefore, each data owner will construct his/her own index table.
Moreover, the storage server is responsible to search the linkable encrypted data points and return the corresponding set of encrypted files, together with these encrypted data points, to a user while the user launches a functional top-k query for selectively retrieving data sets that he/she inquires from the storage server.
To enable the functional top-k query, we formulate the query as: Q j = id, C, T , k, q j , where id denotes a data owner's ID from which the data retrieval is desired, C denotes the categories such as information of restaurant, job, personal health record (PHR), and etc., T denotes a period of time, Q j (j ∈ {1, 2}) denotes what kind of query type under the k highest ratings that the user interests, and q j (j ∈ {1, 2}) denotes the query function. As observed from examples of doctor's and job seeker's demands given in Section I and the relevant application [25] , we define two types of query function: sum function and conjunction function with respect to q 1 = X 1 +X 2 +. . .+X m and q 2 = X 1 ∩X 2 ∩. . .∩X m , where X 1 , . . . , X m denote dimensions/attributes. It should be noted that these two query functions are application dependent, that is, users can employ sum function or conjunction function to aggregate desired information under the applications of multiple attributes such as the introduced examples [5] , [16] , [25] , [32] and their extended scenarios. Besides, the terms of dimensions/attributes in index table and query function q j (j ∈ {1, 2}) can be preserved as the encryption format for preventing storage servers from identifying a particular user and inferring the value of dimensions/attributes.
B. ATTACK MODEL
We assume that the storage servers are untrusted as assumed in the prior works [4] , [29] . Storage servers try to snoop and/or modify the contents of encrypted files and relevant data. For the security issue on the problem of untrusted storage servers, an adversary or a storage service owner is able to arbitrarily manipulate storage servers, meaning that the stored data can be accidentally or maliciously disclosed to competitors or adversaries by an untrusted storage server. The adversary is also able to instruct this kind of storage servers to return bogus and/or incomplete query results when a user issues functional top-k queries. Therefore, we only permit files and their corresponding data points to be securely processed and retrieved over the encrypted domain while disclosing as little information as possible to the storage servers. Additionally, we formalize the returned message including the query results (i.e., inquired data), verifiable objects, and data owner's signature. The verifiable objects and data owner's signature enable users to verify the authenticity and integrity of the query results.
In contrast to the untrusted storage node, only authorized users can decrypt data/files. More precisely, a role-based access policy can be applied for users while setting the system, in which distinct users will be assigned different access privileges based on their relations with the data owner. As a consequence, it is meaningless for the storage servers to collude with some of users; that is, only the data/files related to these users will be revealed. Because user authorization is out of our scope, the reader can be referred to [19] and [33] for detail.
C. DESIGN GOALS
To enable privacy-and correctness-preserving functional top-k query for effective utilization of outsourced and encrypted data under the aforementioned model, our method should have the following goals of security and performance guarantee.
• Privacy and correctness preservation: to explore different mechanisms for designing securely effective searchable and verifiable data structure based on the existing encryption framework while preventing storage servers from learning the plaintext of either files or their corresponding data points.
• Efficiency: the above goal should be achieved with minimum communication and computation overhead.
D. NOTATION AND PRELIMINARY
• DO i -the data owner with ID i.
• N -the number of data owners.
• n -the number of files or data points.
• m -the number of dimensions/attributes.
• C -the category.
• T -the period of time.
• k -the highest rating of inquired data.
• Q j -the query type.
• q j -the query function;
• HMAC i -the signature HMAC supplied by the DO i .
• γ -the number of data points satisfying the query driven by a storage server.
• λ -the number of verifiable objects.
• f j -the j-th file.
• p j -the j-th data point associating to the j-th file.
• d l j -the l-th dimensional data of the data point p j .
• E K a (f j ) -the encrypted form of the file f j while applying AES function with a secret key K a .
• OP p j -the encrypted form of the data point p j while applying OPSE function.
• P rd -the probability of detecting false and/or incomplete query results.
• C ds -the communication cost of a data owner sending verifiable information (e.g., verifiable objects and signature) to a storage server.
• C su -the communication cost of a storage server returning verifiable information to a user. We now introduce the necessary verification background for our proposed scheme:
Merkle Hash Tree: A Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) is a well-studied authentication structure [27] which is intended . to efficiently and securely prove that a set of elements are undamaged and unaltered. It is constructed as a binary tree where the leaves in the MHT are the hashes of authentic data points, as depicted in Fig. 2 . When a user requests for {p 3 , p 5 }, the storage server provides the user with 
and H (H 5 ||H 6 ), where H (H 5 ||H 6 ) is also represented as root node or HMAC, and then checking if the computed root node is the same as the authentic one HMAC i . It should be noted that ''||'' denotes concatenation. It is worth noting that MHT is widely used to authenticate the values of data blocks. However, MHT cannot be directly applied in this paper since it only supports the data set in one-dimensional space. More precisely, it does not support the order relation for multi-dimensional data set so that the storage server cannot retrieve the inquired data efficiently. Moreover, it is unable to be applied for detecting the case that the storage server maliciously returns an incomplete query result in multi-dimension space. To remedy this, in this paper we employ the authentication rule of MHT to further elaborate a layer-based authentication structure, namely LA tree, for multi-dimensional data set. More details regarding to the LA tree are described in the next section.
III. THE MANUFACTURE OF A LAYERED AUTHENTICATION TREE
The Layered Authentication (LA) tree is built to achieve the purposes of efficiently retrieving encrypted data points for storage servers and systematically verifying correctness of query results for users simultaneously. Recall that the encrypted data points are functioned as inverted indices, thus the corresponding files can also be acquired while retrieving the encrypted data points. For easier presentation, we only discuss the manipulations over a set of data points in the following description. First of all, we construct an order-relation graph, a layered data structure to build a relationship among different multidimensional data points, is composed of dominant linkages and order linkages. The dominant linkage, by definition, is that there exists a linkage between the data points p j and p j (1 ≤ j ≤ n) in multi-dimensional space if and only if they satisfy the following two conditions:
Following the above definition, the dominant linkage is leveraged to classify layers for the consideration of efficiently data searching. As an example shown in Fig. 3 9 . The usage of dominant linkage is similar to the work in [16] . Unfortunately, the worst case that there is no dominant relationship among the data points may be happened. Consequently, all data points will be placed in the same level after constructing a LA tree. Even if the probability is very small as processing amount of data points, but still occurs. In this case, it does not influence the manufacture of our mechanism, except for the efficiency of data searching.
The order linkage is that, there exists a linkage between the data points p j and p j (1 ≤ j ≤ n) in multi-dimensional space while these two data points have an order relation (e.g., descending order) in any one dimension. The example is also drawn in Fig. 3 6 , and p 7 are assigned at the same group.
At the same time to establish the linkages, we also record the identities of linked data points (called records for short), as the notation ''(a, b)'' shown in Fig. 3 , to enable users to verify the integrity of inquired data. The records will be transformed to adjacency lists, such as Fig. 4 , and therefore of the lists, will be represented as {Adj [ After constructing an order-relation graph and generating adjacency lists, we operate hash computations for each data point and construct the LA tree to obtain a root node, i.e., HMAC. The algorithm of manufacture of the LA tree can be found in Algorithm 1. As a DO generates n sorted data points p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n with m dimensions, he/she builds an order-relation graph following the rules of connecting dominant and order linkages (steps 1 − 8). During processes of building an order-relation graph, the DO records the linkage types and the identities for each of two data points (steps 3 and 7). Then, the DO transforms these records into adjacency lists (step 9) viewed as one of verifiable objects. For also creating a signature (i.e., an HMAC) as one of a verifiable objects, the DO applies cryptographic hash functions to each data point and then tieing these data points via the rule being similar to MHT [27] (steps 9 − 23) until obtaining an HMAC.
An example of a LA tree for the points p 1 = (90, 200), 25) , p 8 = (75, 60), and p 9 = (115, 45), is shown in Fig. 5 . As exhibited in Fig. 5 , the leaf nodes (blue nodes) are data points, the internal nodes (gray nodes) are signified as hashed data points, and the root node (red node) is denoted as the signature, HMAC. The data points characterizes the order relation in each layer, that is, the first dimension of p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , and p 4 in layer 1 is with the descending order from p 4 to p 1 , and moreover, the second dimension of p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , and p 4 is with the ascending order from p 4 to p 1 . Similarly, the order relations are still reserved in other layers. The hashed data point, as demonstrated in Fig. 5 Build an order linkage from p j to p j and set two data points in the same layer.
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Record the linkage type and the identities of p j and p j . 8 end 9 Generate adjacency lists {Adj
Compute hash value H (p i ). 12 end 13 Set the hashed data points to empty stack. 14 if top 2 hashed data points on the stack are equal height then 15 Pop the two hashed data points, named P left and P right , from the stack.
16
Compute 23 Loop to step 14 until outputting an HMAC.
IV. THE MANIPULATIONS ON DATA OWNERS, STORAGE SERVERS, AND USERS
In pragmatic applications, either outsourced data or issued queries are typically with multi-dimensional space including multiple attributes such as blood sugar, blood pressure, liver indices, etc. Therefore, a functional top-k query defined in our method is that users can launch a demand either
Intuitively, for preserving privacy of data points, it seems natural to have data owners encrypt data points; however, the critical challenge is how a storage server processes the queries launched by users over encrypted data points without knowing their actual contents and replies back verifiable information, together with query results, to the users. In the 
following, we will describe the behaviors of data owners, storage servers and users in details, where a sophisticated LA tree is used to generate verifiable objects and HMAC as the verifiable information. Furthermore, storage servers can efficiently retrieve data without knowing actual contents depending on the property of LA tree.
A. SYSTEM INITIALIZATION
Initially, each data owner and user download OPSE function with the key K o and AES crypto system with the key K a for encrypting/decrypting data points and files, respectively. Moreover, data owners and users manipulate SHA-1 hash function with the key K h to compute signatures while driving LA algorithm. Eventually, each storage server also loads the hash function so that it can generate verifiable objects for user to check authenticity and integrity of the query results.
Subsequently, we will illustrate the manipulations on data owner, storage server, and user in the next subsections.
B. THE MANIPULATIONS ON A DATA OWNER
In this site, we concern that each DO i ∈ {DO j } N j=1 refers to his/her encrypted files and their corresponding encrypted data points to a favorite storage server without disclosing valuable information.
Provided the DO i has n files {f i } n i=1 in a period of time T , he/she extracts the attributes (e.g., the indices of blood sugar, blood pressure, liver, and etc.) called data points from each file. Since each file includes the individual information such as name, address, health record, medical record, and so on, the information should be private. After drawing the data points from the collected files, the files should be encrypted in the form {E K a (f i )} n i=1 via AES function for preventing the information from being leaked while transmitting in the air or storing on storage servers. It is worth noting that each data owner has distinct encryption key from others.
, be the n m-dimensional data points that the DO i collects within T . Drawing n data points from the files, each data owner performs the following steps:
• step 1: Encrypt the set of data points p 1 , . . . , p n into the encrypted form {OP p i } n i=1 via OPSE function, where
).
• step 2: Compute an HMAC i through building LA tree.
An To enable users to verify the authenticity of query results, the DO i applies hash computations over the encrypted data points to compute his/her signature HMAC i . Depending on the above procedures, the LA tree is able to be systematically built; the HMAC i can be availably generated.
• step 3:
) through AES function.
• step 4: Submit the following formation to its nearest storage server.
C. THE MANIPULATIONS ON A STORAGE SERVER
A storage server would store the encrypted data points
and their associated encrypted files
) and HMAC i after receiving a message from the DO i . When a user launches a query specified by either Q 1 or Q 2 , the storage server searches the highest k ratings of encrypted data points which are related to the DO i . If the DO i has γ (γ ≤ k) encrypted data points satisfying the query driven by the storage server, the encrypted data points {OP p j } γ j=1 , combined with verifiable objects, digests for the point OP p j . For clearly describing the manipulations on the storage server, we describe the processes of sum request Q 1 and conjunction request Q 2 in the following two subsections.
1) THE STORAGE SERVER PROCESSES THE SUM REQUEST Q 1
Receiving the sum request Q 1 = id, C, T , k, q 1 , the storage server computes the sum value V j,Q 1 yielded by
. It should be noted that the user can designate which dimensions/attributes are the preferred dimensions/attributes he/she wants to query. Here, we make an assumption of the user will allocate a sequence of dimensions/attributes from 1 to m for easy presentation. Subsequently, the storage server sorts {V j,Q 1 } n j=1 to generate an order list V 1,Q 1 , V 2,Q 1 , . . . , V n,Q 1 and ascer-
The algorithm of the storage server processes the sum request Q 1 is depicted in Algorithm 2.
An Example: For processing the query id = 1, C = PHR, T = May, k = 4, q 1 = X 1 + X 2 over the encrypted data points {OP p j } 9 j=1 , there are γ = k = 4 encrypted data points OP p 1 , OP p 2 , OP p 3 , and OP p 4 satisfying the query.
As the above assumption of γ (γ ≤ k) data points satisfying user's request, the following message format t should be returned to the user:
• case 1: If n ≥ 0 and γ = 0, 
Algorithm 2 The Storage Server Processes the Sum
6 Return the set of γ = k data points OP p 1 , OP p 2 , ..., OP p k .
• case 2: If n ≥ 1 and n ≥ γ ≥ 1,
, HMAC i .
In brief, the first case means that the storage server still needs to return the endorsement H (id||C||T ||K o ) for user's request even though there is no data point satisfying the request. The second case belongs to the aforementioned query result, that is, there are some data points satisfying user's request, thus, the storage server is of necessity to return computed
, combined with the possibly desired encrypted files
), to the user so as to verify the authentic and complete query result.
2) THE STORAGE SERVER PROCESSES THE CONJUNCTION REQUEST Q 2
Upon receiving the conjunction request Q 2 = id, C, T , k, q 2 , the storage server ascertains the highest k ratings of
in the descending order in a clear-cut fashion. Therefore, the satisfying encrypted data points for the Q 2 request are
. The algorithm of the storage server processes the conjunction request Q 2 is exhibited in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 The Storage Server Processes the Conjunction Request Q 2
Input: user's request Q 2 Output: a set of γ data points
Find the highest k ratings of
in the descending order. 3 end 4 Gain a set of data points by calculating
5 Return the set of γ data points.
An Example: For processing the query id = 1, C = PHR, T = May, k = 4, q 2 = X 1 ∩ X 2 over the encrypted data points {OP p j } 9 j=1 , there exists γ = 1 ≤ k encrypted data point OP p 3 satisfying the query.
For the assumption of γ encrypted data points satisfying the request, the following message format t should be returned by the storage server:
• case 1: If n = 0 and γ = 0,
• case 2: If n ≥ 1 and k > γ = 0,
• case 3: If n ≥ 1 and n > k > γ ≥ 1,
• case 4: If n ≥ 1 and n = γ ≥ 1,
, HMAC i . In brief, the first two cases mean that the storage server needs to return the verifiable information (i.e., either
and HMAC i ) to the user even though there is no data point satisfying the user's request, in which κ γ +1 represents that the (γ +1)-th data point will be in the κ γ +1 ratings of data. This would remind the user that his/her requirement will be in the κ γ +1 ratings of data when γ < k; hence, he/she is able to drive top κ γ +1 query to get more interested data in the next time. In the third case, since there exist γ (1 ≤ γ < k) encrypted data points satisfying the query, κ γ +1 ,
and HMAC i
should be transmitted along with
). Eventually, the storage server only needs to respond all satisfying encrypted data points and HMAC i to the user in the last case.
D. THE MANIPULATIONS ON A USER
Once receiving query results t from a storage server, the user will comply with the following verification steps.
• step 1: Determine which of the above cases t belongs to based on its message format. If the t does not satisfy one of the cases in either Q 1 or Q 2 , the query result will be rejected; otherwise, the verification will go to the step 2.
• step 2: Calculate the hashes of all γ data points and use the hashes of all γ data points, together with the received verifiable objects and decrypted adjacency lists, to obtain a root node by reconstructing the LA tree. If the root node is consistent with the authentic one HMAC i (which is the original root node calculated by the DO i ), the query result is authenticity and then go to the step 3; otherwise, the storage server will be treated as the malicious one and the query result will be rejected by the user.
• step 3: Owing to the decrypted adjacency lists, the user can examine whether the qualified data points are maliciously omitted or not. That the qualified data points are maliciously omitted means that, using the example shown in Fig. 6 , the storage server returns a message id = 1, C = PHR, T = 5, 6 )}, HMAC i to the user for the request id = 1, C = PHT , T = 5, k = 4, X 1 + X 2 while the correct message that should be returned is
), {H 4 }, HMAC i . It is noticeable that the order-relation graph rebuilt by the decrypted adjacency lists and the decrypted data points (called existent points in Fig 7) would be formed as a disconnected graph while there is a cut point p 2 (called inexistent point in Fig 7) , such as the example displayed VOLUME 3, 2015 in Fig 7, whence we can detect omitted points against the storage server's malicious behaviors. Ultimately, if the detection in the step 3 is also authorized, the query result is authenticity and integrity; otherwise, the storage server will be treated as the malicious one and the query result will be rejected by the user. 
V. SYSTEM ANALYSIS

Theorem 1:
As long as the encryption algorithm is not breakable, even if any number of storage servers is malicious or compromised, the adversary still cannot know the real content of files and their corresponding data points.
Proof: Our method appends the encrypted data points in the packet in addition to encrypted files and encrypted adjacency lists. Thus, the encrypted data points are the only additional information that the adversary can utilize against the security guarantee, i.e., file confidentiality. The reason is that, the security strength of the file encryption scheme, i.e., AES, has been proven to be secure by the approval of the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) for the Advanced Encryption Standard, [21] . Note that AES is a variant of Rijndael which has a fixed block size of 128 bits, and a key size of 128, 192, or 256 bits. It has 10 rounds for 128-bit keys, 12 rounds for 192-bit keys, and 14 rounds for 256-bit keys. By [21] , the best known attacks were on 7 rounds for 128-bit keys, 8 rounds for 192-bit keys, and 9 rounds for 256-bit keys. Thus, the design and strength of all key lengths of the AES algorithm (i.e., 128, 192 and 256) are sufficient to protect classified information up to the secret level. Top secret information will require the use of either the 192 or 256 key lengths. According to the necessity of the security strength of the file encryption, the variance of a secret level (i.e., 128, 192 and 256 bits) can be selected, and the file content and adjacency lists are clearly well protected. As a result, we only need to focus on data points privacy.
For the nature of OPSE function, its security strength is under the security framework of the pseudorandom function or pseudorandom permutation. Namely, it is by considering that any order-preserving function E K o (·) with the encryption key K o from plaintext-space D = {1, 2, . . . , ξ } to range of ciphertext-space R = {1, . . . , ζ } can be uniquely defined by a combination of ξ out of ζ ordered items, where ξ is the size of the plaintext-space and ζ is the size of the ciphertext-space. An OPSE is then said to be secure if and only if an adversary has to perform a brute force search over all the possible combinations of ξ out of ζ to break the encryption scheme. The way to meet the security requirement for our method is to ensure the number of functions [ξ ] to [ζ ] is sufficiently large. It is suggested to be greater than or equal to 2 128 while setting the security level to be 128 bits. The number of such functions, which is given by the combinations C(ζ, ξ ), is maximized when ξ = ζ /2. And, since (ζ /ξ ) ξ ≤ C(ζ, ξ ), it is greater than or equal to 2 128 as long as ξ = [ζ /2] ≥ 128. Their construction is based on an uncovered relationship between a random order-preserving function (which meets the above security notion, i.e., pseudorandom function or pseudorandom permutation) and the hyper-geometric probability distribution. Also note that we use different orderpreserving encryption keys for the data points in different time domains, which can produce different cipher texts while providing the same plaintext over different time domains and further reduce the risk of information leakage from an over point of view. As a result, it is computationally infeasible for the adversary to get the real content of data points without knowing the encryption key. Therefore, the data point privacy is also preserved in our method.
Theorem 2: Our scheme can detect forged and/or incomplete query results with probability P rd = 1 − negl() when storage servers misbehave, where negl() is a negligible function.
Proof: (Sketch) Let S * = {χ * 1 , . . . , χ * n i , . . . , χ * γ } be the correct query result and S = {χ 1 , . . . , χ n i , . . . , χ γ } be the query result from a storage server. If the examines of step 1 in Section IV-D is satisfied, then we will verify the correctness of query result by applying the following verifications.
We consider that {χ i } γ i=1 are authentic while the computed root node is consistent with the authentic one HMAC i generated by the DO i . The following verification should also be held. Owing to the data structure of LA tree, provided
with λ digests and returned γ data points
can be verified by definition of recursive function f (i, ,â) in verification path is known via the adjacency lists, whereâ
otherwise.
Based on the above recursive function operated over hash computations, if {χ i } γ i=1 are considered to be authentic, the root node must be consistent with HMAC i ; otherwise,
are considered to be unauthentic.
Additionally, if there exists 1 ≤ n i ≤ γ such that χ * n i / ∈ S (that is a qualified data point is maliciously omitted), the user can detect this error. Due to the adjacency lists, the error of maliciously omitting qualified data points can be detected by the user while applying the process in the step 3 of Section IV-D.
Depending on the above verifications, we can detect forged and/or incomplete query results with probability P rd = 1 − negl() when storage servers misbehave and say that the query results are credible while all verifications are passed. Note that when the data points {χ i } γ i=1 are considered to be credible, the associated files are also considered to be credible.
Theorem 3: The additional communication overhead between a data owner and a storage server incurred by our method is given by
(1) Proof: (Sketch) Provided a set of encrypted files
), there exists a set of encrypted data points
, L a and L sig denote the byte-lengths of an encrypted data point, the byte-lengths of the encrypted adjacency list and the data owner's signature (i.e., HMAC i for data owner DO i ), respectively. For each of m dimensions, the data owner transmits n encrypted data points of L p bytes to the storage server. Additionally, the data owner sends an HMAC i of L sig bytes and the
) of L a bytes to the storage server so as to be sure of data correctness. As a result, the extra communication overhead in bytes for m dimensions incurs between the data owner and storage server is 
Theorem 4: The additional communication overhead between a storage server and a user incurred by our method when γ encrypted data points will be responded to a user is given by
Proof: Consider a set of satisfying encrypted files
. There are a number of γ associated data points
, an encrypted adjacency list, a set of verifiable objects, and the data owner's signature that will be returned along with the {E K a (f j )} γ j=1 . As a result, the extra communication overhead between a storage server and a user is given by
where C p , C a , C v , and C s are the communication overhead incurred by transmitting qualified data points, an encrypted adjacency list, verifiable objects, and the data owner's signature, respectively. The storage server needs to return τ i elements including qualified data points and verifiable objects for each layer i ∈ L, where L denotes the set of layers.
The total number of elements that need to be returned can be estimated as i∈L τ i including γ qualified data points and ( i∈L τ i − γ ) verifiable objects. It follows that
Let |L| be the number of layers and E[τ ] be the expect number of elements with rating higher than γ + 1 in each layer. Then Eq. (5) can be rewritten as:
Ultimately, the storage server needs to return the encrypted adjacency list and data owner's signature. We therefore have
Substituting Eqs. (4), (6) and (7) into Eq. (3), we have
Since the length of L a is equivalent to that of L p and the length of L h is equivalent to that of L sig , Eq. (8) can be further rewritten as:
and then the theorem is proven.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, the performance of our method, SFTopk, is evaluated to validate its effectiveness and efficiency.
In our experiments, we use a file level storage system as the searching database, of which the files of individual and their corresponding data points are only permitted to be processed over the encrypted domain. It is noticeable that we only transmit the encrypted data points over the air in our experiments, since it is apparent to use the encrypted data points to link the desired encrypted files.
For the preparation, a laptop with a 1.6GHz CPU and 2GB RAM sends the queries as the mobile client through 802.11b interface. The storage server is set up a QNAP TS-469U-SP, with Intel Atom 2.13GHz Dual-core processor and 3GB RAM, running QNAP Turbo NAS System 3.7. The hash function 160-bit SHA-1 [6] is used to compute digests which will be functioned as verifiable objects and HMAC i . Besides, the encryption function used to preserve data privacy and order relation is 128-bit OPSE function. For performance evaluation and comparison with the renowned method SPLTopk [29] , we measured the communication cost in terms of the number of bytes while transmitting encrypted data points between a data owner and a storage server, and between a storage server and a user; moreover, the computation time in terms of microseconds (µs) is estimated on the data owner, storage server, and user. To compare with SPLTopk fairly, we do not count the communication overhead of transmitting location information, individual reviews, and some other information except for received ratings and auxiliary set, which are included in SPLTopk. Because ATQ [26] VOLUME 3, 2015 has heavy cost in computation and the similar communication overhead compared to SPLTopk, we only compare our method with SPLTopk in the following experiments.
A. COMPUTATION TIME AT A DATA OWNER
The experimental results shown in Figs. 8(a) and 8(b) indicate that when increasing the number of data points and dimensions/attributes, SFTopk costs less computation time in generating verifiable information than SPLTopk. That is because the data owner in SPLTopk supplies a number of data points with m dimensions/attributes, he/she has to compute m data owner's signatures (i.e., HMAC i s) which only incurs one signature in SFTopk. On the other hand, SPLTopk also needs to compute hash chains to guarantee data completeness, which is heavier in computation compared to SFTopk that only records identities of connected data points. Thus, SPLTopk would deplete much computation time in producing verifiable information. In the case of n = 300 and m = 2, the computation time incurred in SFTopk and SPLTopk are about 17974µs and 30594µs, respectively.
B. COMMUNICATION COST BETWEEN A DATA OWNER AND A STORAGE SERVER
Figs. 9(a) and 9(b) show the communication cost of a data owner transmitting data points and verifiable information to a storage server. Results are presented for SFTopk and SPLTopk. Notice that the data owner in both SFTopk and SPLTopk needs to provide verifiable information for the user to verify the correctness of inquired data. In SFTopk, the data owner generates one signature and an encrypted adjacency list through building the LA tree even though there exist multiple attributes. By contrast, when there exist multiple attributes, the data owner in SPLTopk produces multiple hash chains and signatures. It should be noted that signatures, encrypted adjacency lists and hash chains are generally called verifiable information. Then, the data owner transmits the verifiable information, together with the encrypted data points, to the storage server. Because the communication cost is dependent on the number of transmitting bytes, we depict the number of bytes for the communication cost between a data owner and a storage server. SFTopk presents much lower bytes than SPLTopk even though increasing the number of data points or dimensions/attributes. As exhibited the case of n = 300 and m = 2 in Fig. 9(b) , SPLTopk costs almost 2 times the number of bytes more than SFTopk.
C. COMPUTATION COST AT A STORAGE SERVER
Subsequently, we assume that users will query the desired information from a storage server which preserves the number of 100 encrypted data. The storage server will process queries which form the type in either Q 1 of processing queries on a storage server, we demonstrate the evaluations in the number of hash computations and CPU processing time subsequently.
In order to provide verifiable objects for users to verify the correctness of query results, the storage server in both SFTopk and SPLTopk are necessary to compute a number of hash values functioned as verifiable objects. As a result, we compare the performance of producing hash values in SFTopk with that of producing hash values in SPLTopk and show the evaluation of hash computations in Fig. 10(a) . As shown in Fig. 10(a) , the number of hash computations in SPLTopk, for one dimension, is akin to that of hash computations in SFTopk due to the similar number of satisfying encrypted data points and the counts of generating verifiable objects. Conversely, we can distinguish the number of hash computations in SFTopk from that of hash computations in SPLTopk while increasing the dimensions/attributes. As shown the case of k = 40 and m = 2 in Fig. 10(b) , SPLTopk takes about 1.9 times computations more than Q 1 request of SFTopk and takes about 1.6 times computations more than Q 2 request of SFTopk. Besides, for clearly showing the efficiency of SFTopk, we record the CPU time, mainly including the time of searching inquired data points and the time of computing verifiable objects, on the storage server. The experimental results are shown in Figs. 11(a) and 11(b) . According to the results, the CPU time of SPLTopk costs about 2.2 times and 4 times more than that of SFTopk in 2 dimensions and 3 dimensions, respectively.
It is worth noting that showing in Fig. 10(b) and Fig. 11(b) , because the query result generated by SFTopk is a combination of multiple dimensions/attributes, the number of hash computations and CPU time are not completely relevant to the number of dimensions/attributes. More precisely, the number of hash computations, which is the number of witnesses for a user to verify the correctness of query result, will also be impacted by the number of satisfied data points and their positions on LA tree. Temporarily using the example in Fig. 5 , if the satisfied data points are all data points, there is no hash computation. Without or less hash computations, CPU time will also be impacted.
D. COMMUNICATION COST BETWEEN A STORAGE SERVER AND A USER
In Fig. 12(a) , the experimental results are yielded for responding the query results to the user while parameter k is varied from 1 to 100. Since SFTopk returns less verifiable information in responding to the user's request than SPLTopk does, SFTopk presents much lower cost than SPLTopk in communication. In addition, as depicted in Fig. 12(b) , SPLTopk takes about 2 times communication cost more than Q 1 request of SFTopk and takes about 3.6 times computations more than Q 2 request of SFTopk in the case of k = 40 and m = 2. It is worth noting that Q 2 request may take less number of bytes than Q 1 before k reaches 100. Since Q 2 query is that the user asks the storage server to find out X 1 X 2 and X 1 X 2 X 3 for 2 dimensions and 3 dimensions, respectively, the number of encrypted data points derived from the database of the storage server may be less or equal to these of data points derived by launching Q 1 .
E. COMPUTATION COST AT A USER
Upon a user receives a query result from a storage server, the user needs to verify correctness of the query result. During the verification, the user needs to compute the digests and rebuild the LA tree to produce a root node. We show the number of hash computations and the computation time for the verification at the user in Fig. 13(a) and Fig. 14(a) , respectively. The number of hash computations and the computation time are relevant to both the number of returned data points and the counts of computing root nodes. Compared to the hash computations of SFTopk for Q 1 and Q 2 requests, SPLTopk costs more 2 times and 3.8 times, respectively. For the computation time, Q 1 request of SFTopk costs 1787µs, Q 2 request of SFTopk costs 934µs, and SPLTopk costs 3496µs in the case of k = 40 and m = 2. As a result, at the user cite, SFTopk is more efficient than SPLTopk in computation cost. Also, as observed from Fig. 13(b) and Fig. 14(b) , because the query result in SFTopk is a combination of multiple dimensions/attributes, the number of hash computations and computation time of verification are not completely relevant to the number of dimensions/attributes. The reason is the same as described in Section VI-C for Figs. 10(b) and 11(b).
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a secure functional top-k query method, named SFTopk, to deal with untrusted storage servers. SFTopk emphasizes functional top-k query while preserving data privacy, authenticity and integrity; that is, users are able to launch either Q 1 = id, C, T , k, X 1 + X 2 + . . . + X m or Q 2 = id, C, T , k, X 1 ∩ X 2 ∩ . . . ∩ X m to a storage server and only allow processing these queries in the encrypted domain. SFTopk elaborates LA tree, cooperated with an order-preserving encryption, to preserve data privacy and correctness of query results. Furthermore, it reserves the property of order relation for encrypted data points so that the storage servers can efficiently search inquired data over the encrypted domain. Through experimental results, it is shown that SFTopk significantly outperforms the prior works for multi-dimensional data sets in terms of communication overhead and computation cost. 
